ing just to their north and began to turn to face the oncoming southerners. In the meantime, another of Wadsworth's brigades had come onto the fi eld and entered McPherson's woods south of the pike. Th ey were the Black Hats, Brig. Gen. "Long Sol" Meredith's famous Iron Brigade of the West. Four of these regiments quickly clashed in mortal struggle with Archer's men. Th e Iron Brigade's other regiment, the Sixth Wisconsin, augmented by the Iron Brigade Guard of some one hundred men, was at fi rst held in reserve but now double-timed north to head off the oncoming attack of Davis. Th e Wisconsin boys deployed along the Cashtown Pike and began fi ring at the Rebel charge. Two of Davis's regiments, feeling the threat on their southern fl ank, quickly swung into line along the railroad right-ofway that ran parallel to, and 150 yards to the north of, the Cashtown Pike. Th e Forty-Second Mississippi, which was advancing between the pike and rail line, saw the oncoming New York regiments and ducked into the west end of the steep-sided cut that carried the rail line on a level path through McPherson's Ridge.
Th e two opposing forces faced each other briefl y, and then the Union troops charged across the intervening fi eld and routed the three Confederate regiments. Many were killed and wounded on both sides. Th ough most of the Rebels fl ed to the north and west, 232 of them surrendered and were marched off to captivity. Th e victorious Federals regrouped and prepared to meet a further Confederate attack that was gathering to the west. Th at was not long in coming, and the strength of the Southern assault overwhelmed Wadsworth's division and drove them back into the town of Gettysburg.
Th e story of the battle in the railroad cut northwest of Gettysburg has been told from several perspectives. Th e events of the half hour or so at midday, July 1, 1863, have received so much detailed analysis that another article on the subject may seem redundant, but there are several matters that could still be open to reconsideration.
Th e Battle of Gettysburg began when Maj. Gen. Henry Heth dispatched two Confederate brigades toward the town of Gettysburg from his base at Cashtown to probe the Union positions. Led by Brig. Gen. James J. Archer south of the Cashtown Pike and Brig. Gen. Joseph Davis north of the pike, the two brigades fi rst encountered dismounted Union cavalry units under Brig. Gen. John Buford. Th e embattled cavalryman sent word for infantry reinforcements. Th e fi rst units of the Army of the Potomac approaching from the south belonged to Maj. Gen. John Reynolds's First Corps, led by the division under Maj. Gen. James Wadsworth. Wadsworth's front brigade, commanded by Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutler, rushed north along the west edge of the town and crossed the pike. Before Cutler's troops were well in place, Davis's brigade (from left to right, the Fift y-Fift h North Carolina, the Second Mississippi, and the Forty-Second Mississippi regiments) wheeled across a long sloping fi eld and swooped down on them.
Davis's men chased Cutler's two northernmost regiments off the fi eld into a nearby wood and nearly annihilated his center regiment, the 147th New York. Cutler's two regiments south of the Cashtown Pike, the Ninety-Fift h New York and the EightyFourth New York (also called the Fourteenth Brooklyn), became aware of the disaster develop-
The Railroad Cut Reconsidered
Robert W. Sledge maybe true as far as it goes, but it implies that the whole Second Mississippi was captured more or less intact as a unit. Other nearby monuments make similar claims.
• Aft er the war, a Mississippian appealed for the return of "the fl ag of Second Mississippi, captured, with entire regiment, by Sixth Wisconsin Nevertheless, Buford's and Wadsworth's units, though pushed off the battleground, had purchased with their blood suffi cient time for the remainder of the Army of the Potomac to come up and enter the engagement that became the three-day Battle of Gettysburg. Th e battle at the railroad cut left behind many reports, memoirs, and interpretations, which sometimes confl ict with each other and with the facts of the terrain, leaving several matters up in the air.
Was the Entire Second Mississippi Actually Captured, as Claimed?
Th e business of just what was captured has been greatly exaggerated by both sides. Th e claims are that the entire Second Mississippi, or maybe even two full regiments, fell prisoner at the railroad cut:
• Th e Iron Brigade marker on the southeast side of the cut says, "In the charge made on this rr Cut, the 2nd Miss. Regt, offi cers, men and battle fl ag surrendered to the 6th Wis. " Th at's Herdegen's statement is much more accurate than the ones previously quoted. Its numbers rightly refute the claims that the entire regiment was captured, suggesting that only ninety-four soldiers from the Second were taken (eighty-seven enlisted men plus seven offi cers), hardly a full regiment. In fact, the records of the Second Mississippi identify eight, not seven, offi cers by name and, also by name, 119 other ranks of the regiment who were made prisoners at the railroad cut. So the real enteen captured; plus an additional nine who were successfully evacuated were wounded. Th ese names add up to a minimum of 153 men who were not captured or killed the fi rst day. And this does not include others who were not reported as casualties during the whole campaign and who got away with the rest of the Army of Northern Virginia.
Th e numbers, and the names that go with them, force the conclusion that everybody was wrong to think that even half the Second Mississippi, much less the entire regiment, marched off the fi eld as prisoners on July 1. But such is the fog of war, and such is the inevitable temptation to dramatize a feat of arms. Of course, it is absolutely true that the regimental battle fl ag was seized and that the acting regimental commander was captured. It is thus possible to pardon some exaggeration, but it is not prudent to ignore it. Th e Second Mississippi Infantry Regiment was not captured at the railroad cutonly elements of it were, along with its fl ag and its third-ranking offi cer.
Was the Railroad Cut Really a Trap?
Th e terrain of Gettysburg is not quite the same today as it was 150 years ago. Th e railroad cut now has a nicely ballasted roadbed with neat ties and straight rails; then, it was a rough trench strewn with the debris of the digging. On the north rim of the cut the crest of the ridge was crowned with a small copse of trees, where today it is bare, save for man-made markers.
Today there is a south-north berm that carries Reynolds Avenue on a bridge across the top of the cut; then, the fi eld between the cut and the pike was more level, though sloping slightly to the east, with better east-west visibility.
On the 150th anniversary the fi eld of the Sixth Wisconsin's charge was sown with four-foot-high ripening wheat. In 1863 it was grass.
Th ose elements aside, however, much is the same. Th e railroad cut, hewn into the rocky ground of McPherson Ridge, has just about the same dimensions. Very little erosion has occurred. Th e distance between the Cashtown Pike and the railroad bed is the same. Th e slope of the fi eld of the charge is the same. And the fi eld north from the cut has the same rise as before. Th e result is that some things about terrain can clearly be seen today, and were "60 guns strong" for Pickett's charge on July 3. 12 And even that is an underestimate, given the number of casualties reported for July 3.
Regimental records suggest that 492 offi cers and men of the Second Mississippi were on the roster at the beginning of the battle. 13 If so, the 127 captives represented about 26 percent of the full complement of troops, a far cry from being the whole regiment. Th e losses of the other two Confederate regiments were smaller, so no one could claim capturing a whole regiment there either. Th e full total of 232 in the railroad cut was still well under half the Second's strength (and the Fift y-Fift h North Carolina and the Forty-Second Mississippi were each even larger), so it is better to say a small battalion or, perhaps, less than half a regiment was taken prisoner. Th e notion that the whole Second was captured at the railroad cut is obviously a serious exaggeration, a mistake that both sides compounded in later years and has continued in the present. In truth, at least two-thirds of the regiment survived the encounter. We may assume that not all the 492 were committed to combat July 1. Some, like the usual fl ag bearer, Sgt. C. C. Davis, were sick; some, such as Col. John M. Stone, were wounded in the fi elds north of the railroad cut before the climactic encounter. Still others, including Lt. Col. David Humphreys, 14 were listed as present for duty but were actually elsewhere on detail.
Among the remaining members of the Second Mississippi, at least 153 can be accounted for by name as casualties in the next two weeks, and there were certainly still more who were not casualties. Despite Sergeant Vairin's claim of sixty muskets for Pickett's charge (Vairin may not have been including offi cers), 15 the Second lost twelve men killed and fi ft y-four captured on July 3, and a fair number more were able to withdraw to Confederate lines. Over the next few days, another forty-eight men of the Second, many of them with the wagon train of the wounded, were captured during the retreat to the Potomac. In the rearguard action at Falling Waters a few days later, two more were killed and sev- 17 Obviously the Second Mississippi was not hampered by the cut; they were quite free to fi re on the opposing forces. Quite free-Colonel Dawes lost a third of his command in less than fi ve minutes. Davis's men took position along the railroad line because it was a physical phenomenon for much of its length; but on the east end, it was only a psychological one. It gave the Fift y-Fift h North Carolina a place to line up, much as a marching band might fi nd its alignment by using a football fi eld's yard lines.
Th e railroad cut was recognized by both sides as an excellent protection from fi re. Th e lieutenant commanding the left platoon of the Iron Brigade Guard observed that "they had taken advantage of a deep railroad cut, a splendid position for them, and threatened death and destruction to any regiment that attempted to dislodge them. "
18 Later in the aft ernoon, when Cutler's brigade was being driven back across the ridge toward the town, Cutler "moved the brigade to the railroad, with a view to forming under cover of its bank and trying to hold [the enemy] in check there. " At that point, he received orders to withdraw eastward. When he and his men left the shelter of the cut and were exposed "on the railroad embankment, " they came under heavy fi re again.
19 Rufus Dawes himself also took advantage of the cut. Not long aft er the capture of Davis's men, Colonel Dawes brought the Sixth Wisconsin to the west slope of McPherson Ridge, where renewed waves of Confederate infantry forced him to retreat, as he "moved back under cover of the railroad cut and . . . took position again in the wood. " 20 Th e two New York regiments in the attack did not face such murderous return fi re as did the Wisconsin regiment. Th e Confederate force facing the New several questions must be raised about the interpretations of the day's events. One such question has to do with the notion that the cut was a trap.
Th ere were, and are, at least three geographic aspects of the Confederate battle line in that two or three hundred-yard stretch of roadbed, and each is diff erent. Th at fact is usually glossed over, and the whole is treated as if it were the same as the western element of the three. Th e westernmost part was a deep, steep-sided artifi cial canyon that completely sheltered the Forty-Second Mississippi but made it diffi cult for them to fi ght. When commentators mention the cut as a trap, they are mostly talking about this segment.
16 Th e right battalion of the Second may also have taken refuge there. Th e second segment of the cut, the part defended by the left battalion of the Second Mississippi, featured the deep cut shallowing out from a depth of six feet or so down to a reach where the walls were about two feet deep. Th is was an ideal rifl eman's position, where men could jump down into it for cover from fi re from the south, but they also could scramble away to the north handily enough if need be. Th is was by no means a trap, though it might slow a man's retreat by a second or two. Th e third stretch of the cut was the roadbed extending east toward Gettysburg, changing from a cut to a fi ll, with little defensive advantage but easy room to withdraw. Th e Fift y-Fift h North Carolina occupied this section. Th e attack of the Sixth Wisconsin struck the Rebel line at the juncture of the Second Mississippi and Fift y-Fift h North Carolina, where Confederate command was divided and cohesion, least.
Troops under Gen. Robert E. Lee (who was sometimes nicknamed the King of Spades) knew that below ground was safer than above ground and that the fi rst order of business was to dig in. At Cemetery Ridge on July 3, as at Fredericksburg earlier and at Cold Harbor later, one could see the futility of charging across an open fi eld against en- charge. Th e Fift y-Fift h was coming onto line along the railroad fi ll at the east end of the cut. "I was so impressed with the fact that the side charging fi rst would hold the fi eld that I suggested to Maj. Blair, commanding the Second Mississippi on my right, that we should charge them before they had their formation completed, " Belo noted, adding that Blair agreed and was about to comply when they received orders to "form a new alignment" and the chance, if such it was, was lost. 23 Presumably that command came from General Davis. In his offi cial report, Davis stated that he "gave the order to retire" under pressure from "greatly superior numbers" of Federals. 24 It appears that Belo got the order and attempted to carry it out, a diffi cult task given the confused state of the Confederate battle array. Possibly Blair did not get the message; whether he did or not, the Second stood and fought, while the Fift y-Fift h withdrew, leaving the left fl ank of the Second totally Dawes could have let the Rebels make the dangerous charge if they wanted to continue their advance. As a practical matter, Dawes's decision to charge may look good in retrospect, but only because it happened to succeed.
As for the choice of the Fift y-Fift h North Carolina and the Second Mississippi to occupy the railroad line, it should be noted that they were mostly north of the railroad and edging east when they came under fi re from the Sixth Wisconsin. 21 To meet that threat and continue their advance, they had to pivot farther and cross the rail line in order to move south. Th e Forty-Second Mississippi, marching east between the pike and the railroad, 22 had less excuse. Th ey funneled into the cut from the western open end or dropped over the southern lip of the cut. Th en their only exit was west along the rail line.
What the unexpected assault did accomplish was to give the Federals the initiative. Maj. A. H. Belo, commanding the Fift y-Fift h North Carolina aft er its colonel was hit, saw the Sixth forming up for a wasn't Belo trapped? Why weren't more of the Fift yFift h trapped? Obviously because they were on the fi ll, not the cut. Why weren't the Forty-Second and the right wing of the Second trapped? Because they were able to run west through the cut. Why were so many from the Second Mississippi captured? Because the veterans on the left wing of the Second, secure in their impromptu trench, stood their ground until overrun by the ferocity of the Wisconsin charge-but not because they were trapped.
Th e cut was not unambiguously safe. Elements of the 147th New York sought refuge in the cut early in the encounter and did fi nd themselves trapped, as much because they were encumbered by wounded comrades as anything else. Others of the regiment used the cut as protection in retreating from the attacking Rebels who, ironically, were the men of the Forty-Second Mississippi.
28 Th e Mississippians found themselves in the same fi x a few minutes later. As Edwin Coddington pointed out, "[T]he railroad cut . . . would prevent a sudden assault on the right fl ank of a line facing west, but if not watched it could also be used as a hidden passage for a fl anking column. "
29 Th e marker celebrating Dawes and the Sixth Wisconsin on the north side of the cut is entitled "Trapped in the Cut" and tells the story of the event by saying, "Trapped between the steep slopes, about 230 Confederates surrendered. " But most of the men who were captured were not the ones "trapped between the steep slopes, " because the cut was not very deep where the surrender occurred. Th e use of gun butts and bayonets and hand-to-hand wrestling shows that these men were on very nearly the same level of ground, and they were the ones who were forced to surrender. Th e prisoners were indeed taken on the railroad grade, but for most, it was not because they were trapped there.
Were the Southerners Well Handled?
Historian Robert K. Krick is among several interpreters who argue that the Confederates were not well served by their commanders on the fi rst day at Gettysburg. He faults corps commander A. P. Hill, division commander Henry Heth, and brigade 28 D. Scott Hartwig, "Guts and Good Leadership, " Gettysburg Magazine 2 (July 1989): 11. 29 Coddington, Gettysburg Campaign, 267.
exposed. 25 Belo may have been right; perhaps they should have attacked.
Did Davis lose his nerve at just the wrong moment? Did the Carolinians get the order fi rst and were thus free to run, as perhaps the Mississippians were not? In the deep part of the cut, of course, once the Yanks reached the lip, the Confederates could not mount a viable defense. Th ey could only run, surrender, or die. A few were killed. Others, like a Forty-Second Mississippi captain, tried to escape, but "the crush was very great and just as I was trying the squeeze through, a big Wisconsin man thrust his bayonet at me" so that he had to give up. 26 But most of them dropped their weapons and ranand got away.
Of Davis's brigade, the ones who were allegedly trapped in the depths of the railroad cut were precisely the ones who escaped-most of the FortySecond Mississippi and the right-hand battalion of the Second. Th e commander of the Eighty-Fourth New York (Fourteenth Brooklyn) said in his report that the Confederates "in line on the left of my line escaped by following through the railroad cut. " 27 Th us the deep part of the cut seems more like a pathway to safety than a trap. Th e ones in the perfect defensive position, the left battalion of the Second, were the ones who were taken. Th e Fift y-Fift h North Carolina, which was on the railroad fi ll to the east, ran north and mostly escaped.
If the brigade was truly trapped, why is it that the left battalion of the Second, where the cut was easily climbed, was captured while the right battalion, sheltered and presumably trapped in the cut, got away to the west along with the Forty-Second? Th e monument marking the left edge of the Sixth Wisconsin's advance shows clearly that they were not facing the deepest part of the cut-the NinetyFift h New York and, eventually, the Eighty-Fourth New York were. To be sure, the New Yorkers took prisoners from their front, men who were added to the ones taken by the Sixth and marched away by Maj. John F. Hauser of the Sixth. Belo, who was close enough to the Second Mississippi to hold conversation with Blair, just barely got away. Why rested brigades to spearhead his move east. And, as noted above, Davis may have ordered a withdrawal at precisely the wrong moment, retreating when he should have advanced, or at least stood fi rm. Nor does Major Blair escape suspicion.
It looks very much, in fact, as if Dawes and his men bluff ed Blair into surrender. Th e two sides were equally matched, with a small numerical edge to the Second; the cut was not the trap it has been depicted, at least where the left of the Sixth Wisconsin and the left of the Second Mississippi met. But the Rebels could not see how many men Dawes had and may have assumed that there were more than there were. Both sides were tired from the morning's exertions and tensions, but the adrenaline of battle would ameliorate that shortcoming, which applied equally. It may be conceded here that the Wisconsin regiment was the freshest of the ones engaged, but they had been double-timing for a couple of miles with only brief rest. In Blair's defense, it must be remembered that the Second's fl ank was eroding as the Fift y-Fift h North Carolina withdrew and Dawes had them enfi laded. A defi ant Blair might still have turned the fi ght around, but more likely he would simply have gotten more of his troops killed.
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Colonel Dawes had and kept control of his regiment except perhaps for the left most company, Company I, and the left -fl anking company of the Brigade Guard under Lieutenant Harris. 34 Dawes's battle cry of "align on the colors" successfully kept his men in some semblance of order, even amid the chaos of close combat. He was able to listen to and comprehend Adjutant Edward Brooks's suggestion that they throw the right-hand company of the Brigade Guard around to enfi lade the Mississippians from the east. He was able to seize control of the tangled mass of men and weapons at the railroad; to seek out the Southern commander; and to make the credible threat "surrender or I will fi re, " which implied that his men would indeed hear and heed his orders.
Major Blair did not have control of his men. He was, aft er all, the third-ranking offi cer of his regi- Krick further suggested that Col. John M. Stone did not know what he was doing. He said that "the colonel commanding the 2d Mississippi admitted aft er the war to General Davis with refreshing honesty that one of his 'most serious diffi culties' was that 'I almost always lost my bearings. '" 32 Th at seems more a matter of refreshing modesty than refreshing honesty and, in any case, is irrelevant to the matter here at hand, since Stone was wounded early in the fi ght and never made it to the railroad cut. Nor could he have lost his bearings, fl anked as his regiment was by the other two regiments. He commanded the Second Mississippi through every one of its battles from 1862 onward unless he was absent or incapacitated. He was neither incompetent nor inexperienced. Th ough the fact may not be entirely germane to his military abilities, Stone later became the longest-serving governor in Mississippi history, before or since. 
To Whom the Glory?
Edwin B. Coddington concludes that the results of the midday battles west of Gettysburg were temporary Union successes because of "the greater tactical skill of the Northern generals. "
36 But which generals? Doubt exists as to who ordered the charge on the railroad cut.
One candidate would be the Iron Brigade commander Solomon Meredith. But he made no such claim and obviously had his hands full fi ghting his other four regiments against Archer. Th e corps commander John Reynolds was killed before the threat of Davis from the north became apparent. A more likely possibility was the division commander James Wadsworth. However, his report of the battle 36 Coddington, Gettysburg Campaign, 274. ment. His command was badly mixed together, probably with elements of the other regiments blended in. One Confederate remembered that, "in changing front, the men got tangled up and confused. "
35 Th e prisoners, taken mostly from the left wing of the Second, represented every company of the regiment, though Company B (nineteen men) and Company E (twenty-fi ve) lost the most. Along with its twelve men killed and six more wounded, Company B suff ered thirty-seven casualties that morning. Th e surrender of Blair's sword did not end the fi ghting, which continued for a few moments. Cpl. William B. Murphy, the regimental fl ag bearer for the Second Mississippi that day, gave up his banner because Cpl. Frank A. Waller seized it, not because Blair ordered it. Aft er Waller took the fl ag, he stood on it and continued to fi ght the remaining combative Rebels awhile longer, though Blair had already tendered his sword. While some surrendered in obedience to Blair's order, others did not.
Sgt. Augustus Vairin of Company B had been an unsuccessful candidate for major in the realignment of the Second Mississippi's leadership in the spring of 1862. He lost the election to then sergeant 35 Vairin, Civil War Diary. The battle for the railroad cut-escape and capture. Map by Phil Laino.
town Pike]. We drove the enemy back, and then I found that the enemy [the Forty-Second Mississippi, coming east between the pike and the railroad grade] were advancing on our right, and were then in our rear, and in possession of one of our pieces of artillery. I immediately ordered my command, Ninety-fi ft h New York Volunteers and Fourteenth New York State Militia, to march in retreat until on a line with the enemy, and then changed front perpendicular to face them, the enemy also changing front to meet us. At this time, the Sixth Wisconsin Regiment gallantly advanced to our assistance. Th e enemy then took possession of a railroad cut, and I gave the order to charge them, which order was carried out gallantly by all the regiments, by which a piece of artillery was recaptured. Th e advance was continued until near the cut, when I directed the Sixth Wisconsin to fl ank it by throwing forward their right, which being done, all the enemy within our reach surrendered-offi cers, battlefl ag, and men. Th ose in line on the left of my line escaped by following through the railroad cut. I held this position until ordered to the rear to join the brigade.
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Dawes denied that he had received any such orders. Th at does not mean that Fowler might not have given an order to charge, but if so, it did not reach Dawes and was issued aft er the fact anyway. Fowler clearly claims much too much tactical omniscience when he says he ordered the fl anking movement. He was too far away either to see the opportunity or to have made the immediate communication necessary to have it done even if he had seen it. Th e Dawes account makes it clear the idea came from one of his subordinate offi cers Edward Brooks. In later years, Dawes and his troops vehemently denounced Fowler's account as an attempt to claim the glory that they felt was rightfully theirs. Th e language of Fowler's report and the lay of the ground lend some support to that assertion. makes him seem less a commander than a spectator, and not a very well informed one at that: "As they [Cutler's men] fell back, followed by the enemy, the Fourteenth New York State Militia, Colonel Fowler; Sixth Wisconsin Volunteers, LieutenantColonel Dawes; and Ninety-fi ft h New York Volunteers, Colonel Biddle, gallantly charged on the advance of the enemy and captured a large number of prisoners, including two entire regiments and their fl ags. " 37 But Biddle was down, wounded; Fowler certainly does not deserve fi rst mention; there were not anywhere near two regiments captured; and only one fl ag was seized.
Wadsworth's report did not further praise the two New York regiments but did include a paragraph celebrating the exploits of the Sixth Wisconsin, mentioning offi cers Brooks, Hauser, Ticknor, Chapman, Converse, Hyatt, and Goltermann and Cpl. Frank Waller by name. He concluded by saying that "the commander of the regiment, Lieut. Col. R. R. Dawes, proved himself to be one of the ablest offi cers on the fi eld. "
38 Th is was not to downplay the valiant eff orts of the two New York outfi ts but simply to emphasize the actions of the Badger regiment. As the attack of Dawes's men reached its successful climax, Wadsworth, who was watching, is reported to have exulted in surprise, "My God, the 6th has conquered them. "
39 Th e offi cial record makes Wadsworth seem a bit misinformed about the whole aff air, but the eyewitness accounts of his staff depict him as a direct and jubilant observer.
One offi cer who did claim the honor of ordering the charge was Col. Edward B. Fowler, commanding the Eighty-Fourth New York and also nominally exercising command over the Ninty-Fift h New York. He reported that he and his two regiments were separated from the rest of Cutler's brigade by a house and a garden at the outset of the battle and were thus unaware of the catastrophe developing north of the railroad cut. But he quickly came to realize what was happening:
[W]e were at once engaged by the enemy's skirmishers from woods to our left and front [the left most regiment of J. J. Archer's brigade, attacking eastward on the south side of the Cash- Rebel victory, but it would have given them a much better chance to take the crucial high ground south of town at Cemetery Ridge the fi rst day. Th e battle of the Round Tops was probably the critical encounter of the whole battle but it might not have taken place at all if the Confederate assault had rolled the First Corps on the morning of July 1.
General Doubleday was not exaggerating when he wrote his report of the encounter:
Th is preliminary battle . . . had the most important bearing on the results of the next two days, as it enabled the whole army to come up and re-enforce the admirable position to which we had retreated [the high ground at Cemetery Hill]. Had we retired earlier in the day, without co-operation with the other parts of the army, the enemy by a vigorous pursuit might have penetrated between the corps of Sickles and Slocum, and have either crushed them in detail or fl ung them off in eccentric directions.
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Rufus Dawes later refl ected that "we had lost the ground on which we had fought, we had lost our commander and our comrades, 51 but our fi ght had Th us it seems clear that it was General Doubleday's order that placed the Sixth Wisconsin in position along the Cashtown Pike. Th e tactical application of that order fell to Colonel Dawes; and he, with Major Pye's concurrence, ordered the attack. Sealing the eastern end of the cut with half the Brigade Guard was Adjutant Edward Brooks's idea, as Dawes handsomely acknowledged. 48 As for the Fourteenth Brooklyn, it was a distinguished regiment with plenty of battle honors, and Colonel Fowler was a capable commander. Th e two regiments oft en fought side by side.
49 But in this particular encounter, it was the Sixth Wisconsin, not 47 Doubleday's report, or, 1:246. Dawes concurs that it was Doubleday who sent the Sixth north; see Dawes's report, or, 1:275, 278 . Biddle, colonel of the Eighty-Fourth, had been wounded earlier; therefore, Major Pye was in command. Th e reports of Civil War generals routinely gave credit to regimental colonels whether they deserved it or not, and the reports equally routinely praised the valor of the generals' personal staff s, though they were not nearly as exposed as the enlisted men and the company-grade offi cers. held the Cemetery Hill and forced the decision for history that the crowning battle of the war should be at Gettysburg. "
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In a near-run confl ict like Gettysburg almost any element could be considered decisive. Surely the fi ght at the railroad cut was one such element.
In summary:
• Th e whole Second Mississippi, or even half of it, was not captured in the railroad cut.
• Th e railroad cut was not as much a trap as suggested, except maybe for the men of the Forty-Second Mississippi, who mostly escaped anyway.
• In this particular encounter, the Fourteenth Brooklyn was less a factor than its colonel claimed. Indeed, it failed to block the west end of the cut, which it could have and should have done.
• Th e retreat of the Fift y-Fift h North Carolina, which had its left more or less anchored near the Sheads Woods, was a decisive Southern error. Did Joseph Davis lose his nerve? • Th e valor and discipline of the Sixth Wisconsin won the fi ght, but at terrible cost. Dawes essentially ran a successful bluff on Blair-the
